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RULE 2019: THE DEBTOR'S NEW WEAPON
MICHAEL DEMARINO*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Consider the following scenario: The owner of investment
property is attempting to sell that property to a prospective buyer.
Now, suppose the buyer knows how much the seller initially
purchased the property for. Is this information the seller wants
the buyer to possess? Probably not. Does this hurt the seller in
negotiating a price? More than likely. Is this unfair? Hedge
funds think so!1

The above scenario is a simplified version of a major concern
face when participating
in Chapter
11
hedge funds
reorganizations. In the world of bankruptcy, namely Chapter 11
reorganizations, hedge funds are major players, and their
increasing involvement in reorganizations does not go unnoticed or
unopposed. 2 A recent decision requiring hedge funds to comply
with Bankruptcy Rule 2019 disclosure requirements 3 may
. Michael DeMarino, J.D., January 2009, The John Marshall Law School.
1. The term "hedge funds" is used throughout this Comment and refers to
any entity that is classified as a "distressed debt investor." The term hedge
fund, therefore, includes actual hedge funds, proprietary trading groups,
venture capitalists, and investment banks.
2. See infra notes 37-39 (discussing in detail the involvement of hedge
funds in bankruptcy proceedings).
3. FED. R. BANKR. P. 2019(a):
(a) Data Required.
In a Chapter 9 municipality or Chapter 11
reorganization case except with respect to a committee appointed
pursuant to § 1102 or 114 of the Code, every entity or committee
representing more than one creditor or equity security holder and,
unless otherwise directed by the court, every indenture trustee, shall file
a verified statement setting forth (1)the name and address of the
creditor or equity security holder; (2)the nature and amount of the claim
or interest and the time of acquisition thereof unless it is alleged to have
been acquired more than one year prior to the filing of the petition; (3) a
recital of the pertinent facts and circumstances in connection with the
employment of the entity or indenture trustee, and, in the case of a
committee, the name or names of the entity or entities at whose
instance, directly or indirectly, the employment was arranged or the
committee was organized or agreed to act; and (4)with reference to the
time of the employment of the entity, the organization or formation of
the committee, or the appearance in the case of any indenture trustee,
the amounts of claims or interests owned by the entity, the members of
the committee or indenture trustee, the times when acquired, the
amounts paid therefore, and any sales or other disposition thereof ....
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discourage hedge funds from participating in Chapter 11
4
reorganizations.
Currently, hedge funds play a major role in Chapter 11
reorganizations but are viewed suspiciously by other participants
in bankruptcy proceedings. 5 In bankruptcy cases, hedge funds
often form unofficial ad hoc committees, and thus become subject6
to Rule 2019 disclosure requirements for unofficial committees.
"While no one doubts that hedge funds believe that their
information is proprietary ...the question remains, what makes
7
them so different than anyone else?"
This Comment will explore the clash between hedge funds'
desire for secrecy and the Bankruptcy Code's requirement of
openness, particularly in the context of Rule 2019 and hedge fund
ad hoc committees. Part II of this Comment will lay out the
origins and rationale of the Bankruptcy Code's disclosure
requirements as well as the exceptions that run counter to this
policy. Part III will discuss the role of hedge funds in the
bankruptcy process as well as two recent cases addressing the

4. See John J. Voorhees, Bankruptcy Rule 2019: A New Battleground,
BANKR. CT. DECISIONS, July 3, 2007, at 4 (discussing a decision of the U.S.

Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York' requiring an ad hoc
committee of equity security holders to comply with Rule 2019).
5. Hedge funds are increasingly holding the loans of companies and often
result in being "aggressive creditors" in the event of a bankruptcy or default.
Seymour Roberts, Jr. & Joe Wielebinski, When Worlds Collide: The Clash
Between Hedge Funds and the Bankruptcy Code, TEXAS LAW, May 21, 2007, at
3, available at http://www.munsch.com/pubs/files/2007%20Marketing%20
Article%20Texas%2OLawyer%20When%20World's%2OCollide%20The%20Clas
h%20Between%20Hedge%2OFunds%20and%20the%20Bankruptcy%2OCode%
20Wielebinski%20&%20Roberts%2005.22.07.pdf.
6. Hedge funds often form ad hoc committees when participating in
Chapter 11 reorganizations. Voorhees, supra note 4, at 5. When hedge funds
form ad hoc committees, they are able to defray legal costs and exert greater
influence as a group. Id. Additionally, ad hoc committees are unofficial
committees according to the bankruptcy code, and therefore, are not subject to
restrictions under Section 1102. Id.
Ad hoc committees consist of security holders who: (1) hold the same or
substantially similar types of claims; (2) discuss and collectively exchange
strategies; (3) seek to negotiate in "lockstep;" and (4) retain a single law firm
to minimize cost. Brief of Amici Curiae the Loan Syndications & Trading
Ass'n & the Securities Industry & Financial Markets Ass'n in Opposition to
Wachovia Bank's Motion to Compel the Informal Comm. of Secured Trade
Vendors to File a Verified Statement Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 2019, at 78, In re Musicland Holdings Corp., (No. 06-10064) 2007 WL 748286
[hereinafter LSTA Brief].
The LSTA is the trade association for all segments of the floating rate
corporate loan market. Id. at 2. Its members include broker-dealers,
investment banks, commercial banks, mutual funds, and other financial
institutions. Id.
7. Will Debtors Wielding Rule 2019 Prompt Hedge Fund Retreat?, BANKR.
CT. DECISIONS, Mar. 27, 2007, at 5.
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unique status of hedge funds in relation to Rule 2019.8 Part IV
will explore the public policy arguments against subjecting hedge
fund ad hoc committees to Rule 2019 and will propose a test for
determining the applicability of Rule 2019 to these committees.
Finally, Part V of this Comment will conclude that this test
advances the public policy behind bankruptcy reorganization.

II. TRANSPARENCY AND BANKRUPTCY: THE BANKRUPTCY CODE'S
REQUIREMENT OF OPENNESS

A. A Traditionof Openness
Under common law, and throughout the American judicial
system, there has been a public policy presumption of maintaining
open and public judicial proceedings. 9 This long-standing policy is
derived from the Constitution. 10 More importantly, this policy
promotes public trust and ensures that justice is distributed
equally. 1 The common law tradition of open and public judicial
proceedings is similarly reflected in the Bankruptcy Code.
The common law principle of open access is fundamental to
bankruptcy proceedings and is codified generally in Section 107(a),
the section that makes filings with the bankruptcy court public
record. 12 The purpose of 107(a) can be gleaned from its legislative
history, which indicates Congress' intent to maintain open access
3
to judicial records in cases of bankruptcy.'
8. In re Nw. Airlines Corp., 363 B.R. 704 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007); In re
Scotia Dev., LLC, No. 07-20027-C-119, slip op. (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2007).
9. In the United States, generally, there has been a strong presumption of
public access to court documents. See Nixon v. Warner Comm., Inc., 435 U.S.
589, 597 (1978) (discussing the long-standing presumption of transparency in
court proceedings); see also Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d
110, 119 (2d Cir. 2006) (discussing constitutional and common law right to
examine court records). The presumption of open access to court records
recognizes the importance attached to the public's right to monitor the
administration of justice. In re Analytical Sys., 83 Bankr. 833, 835 (Bankr.
N.D. Ga. 1978). This presumption of access allows the public to "keep a
watchful eye on the workings of public agencies." Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598.
10. The common law right to public access of judicial documents can be
traced to the First and Sixth Amendments. In re Inslaw, Inc., 51 B.R. 298, 299
(Bankr. D.C. 1985). The common law right to inspect judicial records is
"fundamental to a democratic state" and, like the First and Sixth
Amendments, produces an "informed and enlightened public opinion." United
States v. Mitchell, 551 F.2d 1252, 1258 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
11. See In re Analytical Sys., 83 Bankr. at 835 (observing that an informed
public safeguards "the "integrity, quality, and respect in our judicial system.").
12. Section 107(a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides: "Except as provided in
subsections (b) and (c) of this section and subject to Section 112, a paper filed
in a case under this title and the dockets of a bankruptcy court are public
records and open to examination by an entity at reasonable times without
charge." 11 U.S.C. § 107(a) (2000).
13. See S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 30 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
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Indeed, in the context of bankruptcy cases, the need for public
access of documents is amplified, if not fundamental. 14 Most of the
key decisions in bankruptcy reorganizations, such as the selling of
assets, cannot occur without a court filing and bankruptcy court
approval. 15 Access to such filings necessarily facilitates the
exchange of information between parties in a bankruptcy case.
In addition to Section 107(a), the Bankruptcy Code's
procedural Rule 2019 addresses open access with respect to
unofficial committees. 16 Rule 2019 promotes the principal of open
access by requiring disclosure from unofficial committees
participating in bankruptcy. 17 The need for a rule such as 2019 is
heightened in Chapter 11 where unofficial committees
significantly participate in the reorganization process' 8 and
generate extreme potential for conflicts of interest between
unofficial committee members and the class they represent. 19

5787, 5816 (indicating that Section 107(a) makes all papers filed in a
bankruptcy court public and available to parties to examine).
14. See In re Bell & Beckwith, 44 B.R. 661, 664 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1984)
(noting that the policy of open inspection is fundamental to the operation of
the bankruptcy system because it avoids the appearance of impropriety); In re
Gitto Global Corp., 422 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2005) (commenting that open access
to judicial documents fosters confidence among creditors regarding fairness in
bankruptcy); In re Food Mgmt. Group, LLC, 359 B.R. 543, 553 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2007) (commenting that the public interest in openness of court
proceedings is amplified when concerning the "integrity" and "transparency" of
bankruptcy proceedings is concerned).
15. Bankruptcy has the unique power to modify or alter creditors' state law
contract rights. Brad B. Erens & Kelly M. Neff, Confidentiality in Chapter 11,
22 BANKR. DEV. J. 47, 47 (2005). That the debtor and creditors exchange
information in a public forum is a tradeoff; the debtor who wishes to alter its
creditors' state law rights must do so in an open judicial forum. Id. at 47-48.
16. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 2019(a) (stating the rule applies "except with
respect to a committee appointed pursuant to Section 1102 or Section 114 of
the Code").
17. Rule 2019 is a disclosure rule that allows unofficial committees
participating in a reorganization proceeding to gain credibility and group
influence by filing certain statements with the court. In re Nw.Airlines, 363
B.R. at 707. These statements include the names of security holders, the
amount of the claim, and the time of the acquisition. FED. R. BANKR. P.
2019(a).
18. In Chapter 11 reorganizations, a significant number of creditors are
often participating; hence, Rule 2019 is part of a disclosure scheme designed to
police creditors' groups and those entities acting on their behalf. 9 COLLIER
ON BANKRUPTCY, BANKRUPTCY RULES,
2019.02 (Alan N. Resnick et al. eds.,
15th ed. rev. 2007).
19. Creditors who form unofficial committees, like creditors who form
official committees, compete for a distribution of assets from an insolvent
estate.
Kurt F. Gwynne, Intra-Committee Conflicts, Multiple Creditors'
Committees, Altering Committee Membership and Other Alternatives for
Ensuring Adequate Representation Under Section 1102 of the Bankruptcy
Code, 14 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 109, 119 (2006). Thus, the more one
creditor receives, the less another creditor may receive; this, in turn, may lead
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Non-compliance with Rule 2019 carries grave consequences,
and may result in a court refusing to hear from the ad hoc
committee and denying the committee the right to speak for its
members. 20 As a disclosure rule, Rule 2019 was designed to curb
the abuses of protective committees, a problem that was rampant
in the 1930s. 21 Thus, taken together, Section 107(a) and Rule 2019
are evidence of Congress' strong desire to extend the common law
right of access to judicial records to bankruptcy proceedings.
However, both in the Bankruptcy Code and at common law, this
22
right has limitations.
B. Confidentiality Under the Bankruptcy Code
Notwithstanding the entrenched common law principle of
maintaining public judicial fora, the presumptive right to access is
not absolute. 23 Courts recognize that under certain circumstances,
public access may not be warranted. 24 As a result, at common law,
by
the trial court has discretionary power to protect a party
25
sealing court documents that could potentially harm a party.

to adversity and conflicts of interests among committee members. Id.
20. Rule 2019(b) carries significant consequences for ad hoc committees'
non-compliance. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 2019(b) (stating that a court may
enjoin the ad hoc committee from being heard or from further participation in
the case for failure to comply with Rule 2019(a)).
21. Rule 2019 can be traced to the SEC Report on the Study and
Investigation of the Work, Activities, Personnel and Functions of Protective
and Reorganizations Committees, 1937. In re Nw. Airlines, 363 B.R. at 707According to the SEC, "protective committees" are nonstatutory
08.
committees that the SEC believed should have a fiduciary relationship with its
members. Id. To this end, the SEC Report recommended that persons
representing more than twelve creditors should furnish the information, now
required by Rule 2019, as a means of "provid[ing] a routine method of advising
the court and all parties in interest of the actual economic interest of all
persons participating in the proceedings." Id. (emphasis added).
It is important to note that Rule 2019 applies specifically to unofficial
committees (committees not appointed pursuant to §§ 1102 or 1114 of the
Code). See FED. R. BANKR. P. 2019(a) (stating that the Rule applies to
committees representing more than one creditor and not formed under §§ 1102
or 1114). In the same vein, § 1102(b) requires official creditors' committees to
disclose certain information to the creditors they represent and be subject to
court orders compelling additional disclosures. 11 U.S.C. § 1102(b) (2000),
amended by Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention & Consumer Protection Act of
2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 405(b), 119 Stat. 105, 216 (2005).
22. See infra Part III (discussing the exceptions to and limitations of the
presumptive right of public access in the Bankruptcy Code and common law).
23. See Nixon, 435 U.S. at 597 (citing In re Caswell, 18 R.I. 835, 837 (1893))
(observing that in limited circumstances, courts must deny public access to
documents when used for improper purposes).
24. See City of Hartford v. Chase, 942 F.2d. 130, 135-36 (2d. Cir. 1991)
(stating that Congress has recognized that under "compelling' circumstances,
public access may be abrogated).
25. Id. In addition to common law, Congress has recognized that the
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The Bankruptcy Code similarly recognizes that the right to
public access is not absolute; however, unlike common law courts,
the bankruptcy court's power is not discretionary. 26 Although the
concept of openness is heavily ingrained in the Bankruptcy Code,
operating under such openness is not always in the best interest of
the parties. 27 Consequently, the Bankruptcy Code recognizes that
potential problems can arise from parties having unrestricted
access to documents, and therefore, Section 107(b) of the Code
28
allows parties, under certain circumstances, to file under seal.
Thus, taken together, Sections 107(a) and 107(b) provide a
"framework" for the court to determine whether documents should
29
be public or sealed.
general policy of open access may be abrogated under certain circumstances.
See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2) (recognizing the need for secrecy in grand
jury proceedings); FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1)(G) (recognizing the need for sealing
trade secrets or confidential information).
26. See infra notes 30-31 and accompanying text (discussing the mandatory
language in Rule 2019).
27. Companies find themselves in Chapter 11 often as the result of being
the weakling of competitive industries. Erens & Neff, supra note 15, at 48.
After filing a petition for Chapter 11, the debtor's reorganization may be
hindered by having its business operations and strategies open to the very
same competitors that drove the debtor into bankruptcy in the first place. Id.
28. Notwithstanding the Bankruptcy Code's obvious goal of maintaining an
open judicial forum, Congress foresaw that bankruptcy cases might require
specific court intervention to protect parties from having certain information
made public. In re 50-Off Stores, Inc., 213 B.R. 646, 654 (Bankr. W.D. Tex.
1997). Consequently, 107(b) limits the scope of 107(a) by allowing a party to
file under seal if the contents of the filing fall within one of the categories
enumerated under Section 107(b). 11 U.S.C. § 107(a) (2006). The court,
therefore, will "protect an entity with respect to a trade secret or confidential
research, development, or commercial information." 11 U.S.C. § 107(b)(1)
(2006).
The importance of Section 107(b) cannot be understated. Its significance is
highlighted by its mandatory language that requires the Court, if requested by
a party in interest, to protect such party: "On request of a party in interest,
the bankruptcy court shall.., protect an entity with respect to a trade secret
or confidential research, development, or commercial information .... " Id.
(emphasis added).
29. The mandatory language of Section 107(b) is a key distinction between
common law analysis of when sealing is proper and the Bankruptcy Code's
framework for determining when sealing is proper. See In re Orion Pictures
Corp., 21 F.3d 24, 27 (1994) (observing that, unlike most cases, the bankruptcy
court does not exercise its discretion in finding "extraordinary" or "compelling"
circumstances; rather, the bankruptcy court is required to protect trade
secrets, confidential research, development, or commercial information); see
also In re Gitto, 422 F.3d at 8 (stating that Section 107 "speaks directly to the
question of public access," and therefore, supplants common law analysis of
this issue); In re Food Mgmt., 359 B.R. at 553 (recognizing that Section 107(b)
is a departure from the common law analysis of balancing the public and
private interests in determining whether to allow parties to file under seal).
Although Section 107(b) employs mandatory language, the court still must
make a determination whether the information involved fits into the
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In addition to Section 107(b), limitations to the policy of open
access to bankruptcy filings are accomplished through the
safeguards of bankruptcy's procedural rules, in particular Rule
9018, the procedural counterpart for Section 107.30 The authority
given to the court under Section 107 and Rule 9018 is by no means
foreign to bankruptcy proceedings. 31 Not surprisingly, Rule 9018
bears a strong relationship to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(c)(1)(G). 32 In fact, the first classification of protective orders in
33
Rule 9018 is the same kind authorized under Rule 26(c)(1)(G).
Although the rules are undoubtedly similar, Rule 9018 is
slightly broader. 34 Furthermore, its application does not require a
showing of good cause.3 5 Rule 9018 provides the procedure for
invoking the court's power under Section 107 of the Code, and is
36
therefore, very familiar to hedge funds.

categories of 107(b). 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 18,
107.03.
This determination is a question of fact to be determined by judicial guidelines
of that particular jurisdiction. Id. 107.03[2].
30. Bankruptcy Rule 9018 implements the powers given to the court by
Bankruptcy Code Section 107, and when taken together, codify the Supreme
Court' decision in Nixon. Mark D. Bloom et al., Reorganizing in a Fish Bowl:
Public Access vs. ProtectingConfidential Information, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 775,
781 (1999).
31. Collier points out that the Advisory Committee Note to former
Bankruptcy Rule 918, a rule containing similar provisions to Section 107,
indicates that prior to the formulation of either Bankruptcy Rule 9018 or
Section 107, bankruptcy judges had the inherent power to issue protective
orders, which are now addressed by Rule 9018 and Section 107. 10 COLLIER
ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 18, 9018.RH.
32. Id.
9018.04. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c)(7) provides: "A
party... may move for a protective order ... [and] [t]he court may, for good
cause, issue an order... requiring that a trade secret or other confidential
research, development, or commercial information not be revealed.... ." FED.
R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1)(G).
33. Both Rule 9018 and Rule 26(c)(1)(G) protect trade secrets, confidential
research, development, or commercial information.
10 COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY, supra note 18, 9018.R.H.
34. The civil rule applies only to discovery, whereas Rule 9018 takes into
account that a need for a protective order may arise in the context of a nondispute. Id. 9018.04. Thus, Rule 9018 is a broader-based authorization that
reflects a greater need for protection in the arena of bankruptcy. Id.
35. A court's power to issue a protective order under Rule 26(c) is limited to
situations where "good cause" has been shown. Jepson v. Makita, 30 F.3d 854,
858 (7th Cir. 1994). Generally, good cause requires a showing that if the
information is disclosed, serious and clearly defined injury will occur. In re
Handy Andy Home Improvement Ctrs., Inc., 199 B.R. 376, 380 (Bankr. N.D.
Ill. 1996).
Under Rule 9018, however, there is no requirement to show "good cause."
Id. at 382. While Rule 26(c) expressly requires "good cause" even when the
material protected is a "trade secret or other confidential research,
development, or commercial information," the Bankruptcy Code does not
impose such requirement. In re Orion, 21 F.3d at 28.
36. Bloom, supra note 30, at 781.
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C. Hedge Funds and Bankruptcy
Hedge funds are widespread in the world of bankruptcy, often
37
finding financial opportunity in Chapter 11 reorganizations.
Traditionally, hedge funds have played a significant role in the
stock market, but recently have become heavily involved in the
debt market. 38 More specifically, hedge funds have plunged into
the distressed debt market, one of the fastest growing investment
39
categories.
As credit markets tighten in the wake of the current subprime
crisis, 40 so-called "vulture funds," named for their emphasis on
distressed-debt investing, are preparing to feast.41 Distressed-debt
investors, such as hedge funds, buy this typically unattractive debt

37. Many hedge funds employ an event driven strategy, taking advantage
of financial opportunities created by spin-offs, mergers and acquisitions,
reorganizations and bankruptcies. Rene M. Stulz, Hedge Funds: Past Present,
and Future 13 (Working Paper No. 2007-3, 2007), available at
http://www.cob.ohio-state.edu/fin/faculty/stulz.
38. According to recent estimates, hedge funds account for nearly half of
the trading on the New York and London stock exchanges. Jenny Anderson,
As Lenders, Hedge Funds Draw Insider Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2006, at
Al. In addition to the stock market, hedge funds recently have become major
players in the debt market. Id. Additionally, hedge funds currently generate
more than eighty-five percent of the United States trading volume in
distressed debt.
Hedge Funds Dominate Distressed Debt, BANKR. CT.
DECISIONS, Sept. 11, 2007, at 2. Moreover, hedge funds also generated thirty
percent of the United States fixed-income trading volume for last year, as well
as generated a quarter of the trading volume from asset-backed securities. Id.
39. The Vultures Take Wing, ECONOMIST, Apr. 13, 2007, at 77-79, available
at http://www.economist.com/finance/displaystory.cfm?story-id=8929289
(reporting that 170 institutions, with an estimated $300 billion to invest,
invest primarily in distress). This is more than ever before and is an
indication that distressed debt investing is now attracting the attention of
mainstream investors, and is no longer reserved to specialists. Id.
40. In the wake of falling home values and rising interest rates,
foreclosures are at a record level and are expected to increase, possibly into
epidemic proportions in the near future. See Carolyn Said, Living The
American Nightmare:Foreclosures on the Rise, S.F. CHRON., July 29, 2007, at
Al (discussing the recent wave of home owners who can no longer afford to
meet their mortgage obligations). The "subprime" market is at the root of this
problem. Press Release, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Bd. of
Governors of the Fed. Reserve System, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Office of Thrift
Supervision, Expanded Guidance for Subprime Lending Programs (Jan. 31,
2001) [hereinafter 2001 Guidance], available at http://www.fdic.govlnewsl
news/press/ 2001/prO90la.htm. The increase in foreclosures can be traced to
the increasingly large amount of loans made to subprime borrowers. Id.
Although the definition of "subprime" is not consistently defined in the
marketplace or among individual institutions, the term generally refers to
individuals who have less than credit worthy histories. Id.
41. Cashing in on the Crash, ECONOMIST, Aug. 23 2007, at 69, available at
http://www.economist.com/ finance/displaystory.cfm?story-id=9687782. In the
first seven months of 2007, vulture funds raised $15.6 billion, more than the
$13.9 billion raised in all of 2006. Id.
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in the secondary market because of its potential for higher
returns. 42 Given the regulatory scheme governing hedge funds,
they are extremely flexible entities capable of capitalizing on the
in distressed investing and
substantial opportunities available
43
Chapter 11 reorganizations.
Within the financial community, however, hedge funds are
viewed suspiciously, especially with regard to their lending
Part of this suspicion arises from hedge funds'
activity. 44
reputation for being aggressive creditors that exert influence over
their highly leveraged borrowers. 45 Moreover, hedge funds often
emerge from reorganizations as the owners of the companies to
which they lend, and hence, hedge funds have become a target of
the trustee and other creditor committees in bankruptcy
46
reorganizations.
While participating in a Chapter 11 reorganization, hedge
funds often form ad hoc committees in order to defray attorney
fees and speak with one voice. 47 This raises two important issues
that have been side-stepped by the courts. First, the threshold
issue of whether ad hoc committees are subject to Rule 2019.48 In

42. Vultures Take Wing, supra note 39. In the second-lien loan market, the
primary lender gets repaid before the secondary lender in the event of a
default. Anderson, supra note 38, at Al. In exchange for this greater risk, the
secondary lender earns a higher interest rate. Id.
43. Hedge funds generally do not have to comply with the stringent
disclosure and registration requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of
1933 because they fit into a registration exemption available to funds that
only engage in private placement of securities; if a fund does not engage in
public offerings, the fund is not required to register with the SEC. Securities
Act of 1933, ch. 38, tit. I § 4, 48 Stat. 77 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §
77d (2000).
44. Lending, once dominated by highly regulated banks, is an attractive
investment vehicle for hedge funds. See Anderson, supra note 38, at Al. The
lending practices of hedge funds raise suspicions because unlike banks, they
are not required to separate their various lines of business and as a result,
trading on inside information is possible. Id.
45. See id. (stating that hedge funds are powerful creditors, often serving
on committees and boards of the borrowing company).
46. An illustration of the type of hedge fund activity that creates ill will in
bankruptcies is found in In re Radnor, 353 B.R. 820 (Bankr. Del. 2006). In
Radnor, the hedge fund provided loans to Radnor to refinance its existing
debt. Id. at 828-29. Subsequently, the hedge fund acquired equity in Radnor
and obtained a seat on its board. Id. at 829. When the company filed for
Chapter 11, the hedge fund became a bidder of the company's assets. Id. The
committee of unsecured creditors opposed this sale, arguing that the hedge
fund engaged in a 'loan to own" strategy that increased the company's
insolvency. Id. at 830.
47. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (discussing the advantages of
forming an ad hoc committee).
48. This issue turns on whether the court classifies the ad hoc committee as
a committee under Rule 2019. See Voorhees, supra note 4, at 5 (commenting
that courts have not successfully answered the question of "what is a
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other words, are they a committee within the meaning of Rule
2019? Second, if they are a committee under Rule 2019, is their
information protectable under Section 107(b)? These issues were
addressed by the court in two important cases.
D. In re Northwest Airlines
A recent decision in the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern
District of New York is a source of angst and consternation for
hedge funds that participate in Chapter 11 reorganizations. 49 In
re Northwest Airlines addressed the challenge by a debtor to the
Rule 2019 statement of an ad hoc committee of equity holders. 50
The debtor argued that the ad hoc committee's statement only
listed the aggregate holdings of the group and not the required
individual holdings of its members; consequently the debtor
argued that the filed statement was deficient. 51 The court agreed
with the debtor and ordered the ad hoc committee to comply with
Rule 2019.52

In response to the order to comply with Rule 2019, the ad hoc
committee sought to file its amended Rule 2019 motion under seal
based on Section 107(b) and Rule 9018.53 The court denied this
4
motion on the basis that it frustrates the principle of Rule 2019,6

and that the information to be disclosed did not constitute
"commercial information." 55

committee not appointed pursuant to Section 1102?").
49. See Mark Berman & Jo Ann Brighton, Will the Sunlight of Disclosure
Chill Hedge Funds? The Tale of Northwest Airlines, ABI J., Vol. XXXVI No. 4,
at 24 (May 2007) (discussing the impact of Northwest on hedge funds).
50. In re Nw. Airlines, 363 B.R. at 705-06.
51. Id.
52. Id. In determining that the ad hoc committee must comply with Rule
2019, the court found that the members of the share holders' committee
formed an ad hoc committee, and that "by acting as a group.., this [ad hoc]
[c]ommittee subordinated to the requirements of Rule 2019." Id. at 708.
53. Filing the Rule 2019 statement under seal would only make the
statement available to the Court and the U.S. Trustee. Id. at 705-06. The ad
hoc committee argued that filing under seal was necessary to protect its
members' investment strategies. Id. at 708. In particular the ad hoc
committee argued that exposure of their basis would give their counterparties
an unfair advantage. Id. In other words, the ad hoc committee's bargaining
position would be seriously damaged if their competitors were to know their
actual acquisition cost. Id.
54. See id. at 709 (stating that any interest individual members may have
in keeping the statement confidential is outweighed by the interests that Rule
2019 seeks to protect, namely that the other share holders need to be informed
of "where a committee is coming from").
55. Id. at 707; see also id. at 708 n.8 (stating that preserving leverage is
usually not an interest that would justify sealing court records).
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E. In re Scotia Development
In stark contrast to the Northwest Airlines decision is the In
re Scotia Development, decision. The Scotia court denied the
debtor's motion to compel the ad hoc note holder committee to fully
comply with Rule 2019.56 The Scotia decision, however, failed to
provide an explanation for why the ad hoc committee of note
57
holders was not a committee contemplated by Rule 2019.
The Northwest Airlines and Scotia decisions bring uncertainty
to the applicability of Rule 2019' to ad hoc committees and raises
the question of whether Rule 2019 will extend to other groups that
form committees or share counsel. Moreover, the Northwest
Airlines decision has been criticized for the potential chilling effect
on the participation by hedge funds in Chapter 11 reorganizations.
Part III of this Comment will examine the definition of
"committee," as contemplated by Rule 2019, and as argued by the
parties and amici to Northwest Airlines. Additionally, Part III will
discuss the protected categories under 107(b), and whether ad hoc
committees' information is entitled to be filed under seal.
III. Analysis
A. Scope of Rule 2019
Analysis of the requirements under Rule 2019 and to whom
the rule applies is a difficult task because there is limited case law
dealing with the subject. 58 A review of the little case law that does
exist, however, reveals that courts have applied the requirements
of Rule 2019 quite broadly, 59 as is within their discretion under
60
Section 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.
One example of such discretion is where a court held that
Rule 2019 encompassed potential conflicts arising from fee sharing
56. In re Scotia Dev., LLC, No. 07-20027-C-11 Slip op. at 1 (Bankr. S.D.
Tex. May 29, 2007).

57. See Voorhees, supra note 4, at 5 (mentioning the lack of analysis and

"opaque" decision of In re Scotia).
58. 9 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 18, T 2019.04[4].

59. Id. Some courts have required strict compliance with the rule, often
resulting in harsh consequences. See, e.g., In re Baldwin-United Corp., 52
B.R. 146, 148 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1985) (holding that the 2019 statement was
deficient because it did not list the names and addresses of class members); In
re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 101 B.R. 844, 852 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989) (requiring
a consumer union representing ticket holders to show that every ticket holder
had authorized the consumer union to act as his or her representative). But
see In re Trebol Motors Distrib. Corp., 220 B.R. 500, 503 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 1998)
(holding that a class certified prepetition is a single claimant and does not

need to comply with Rule 2019).
60. The court has broad power to "issue any order.., necessary or
appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title ... or appropriate to
enforce or implement court orders or rules ..

(emphasis added).

" 11 U.S.C § 105(a) (2000)
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and referral relationships. 61 While these disclosures are not
specifically or explicitly required under Rule 2019,62 the court
found that the precise nature of these relationships fell within the
"literal language of the rule as well as the Judge's discretion to
'
apply... [R]ule [2019]. "63
Although courts have generally applied Rule 2019 broadly, it
may be inappropriate to require strict compliance given that the
Bankruptcy Code favors unofficial committees' participation in
bankruptcy cases. 64 Moreover, broadly or strictly applying Rule
2019 often results in courts refusing to hear from the parties, a
65
result that runs counter to Bankruptcy Code policy.
B. The History and Purpose of Rule 2019
Any analysis regarding Rule 2019's applicability to ad hoc
committees participating in Chapter 11 reorganizations must
begin by exploring the history and purpose of Rule 2019. As
previously stated,6 6 Rule 2019 is part of a general disclosure
scheme designed to curtail the abuses of protective committees. 67
Protective committees were formed to protect the interests of
constituents holding similar classes of securities. 6 8
However,
protective committees were largely criticized because of abuses
resulting from conflicts of interest between security holders and

61. The appellants challenged the bankruptcy judge's Rule 2019 order
requiring appellants to include a detailed explanation of any type of cocounsel, consultant or fee sharing arrangements. Baron & Budd, P.C. v.
Unsecured Asbestos Claimants Comm., 321 B.R. 147, 166 (D.N.J. 2005).
62. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 2019(a) (making no mention of disclosure
requirements regarding fee sharing or referral arrangements).
63. Baron & Budd, 321 B.R. at 167. One of the main reasons the appellate
court upheld the judge's Rule 2019 order is that the order promoted the
underlying goals of Rule 2019; preventing conflicts among creditors and
increasing fairness in reorganization. Id.
64. The Bankruptcy Code recognizes the importance of unofficial
committees by treating the costs of unofficial committees as administrative
expenses with priority of payment over other unsecured creditors. 11 U.S.C.
§ 503(b)(3)(D) (2000).
65. See 9 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 18, at 2019.04[4] (stating
that strict compliance with the rule is impractical because it silences parties
intended to be heard, namely, unofficial committees). For further analysis of
2019 consequences for non-compliance, see supra note 20 and the
accompanying text.
66. See supra note 21 and accompanying text (presenting a brief
background on protective committees).
67. Protective committees were non-statutory committees organized by
insider groups who would solicit smaller investors to enter into a deposit
agreement that binds the depositor to go along with the protective committee.
Evan D. Flaschen & Kurt A. Mayr, Bankruptcy Rule 2019 and the
UnwarrantedAttack on Hedge Funds, ABI J., Sept. 2007, at 16.
68. Gwynne, supra note 19, at 110.
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the protective committee.6 9
In particular, Rule 2019 was designed to ensure that the
inside group of the committee does not manipulate the committee
to "secure a dominant position in the reorganization" at the
expense of minority constituents. 70 In other words, Rule 2019
assures that distribution of assets is made in the proper amount,
to the proper creditor. 7 1 Moreover, without such a rule, there is a
danger that a party allegedly acting on another's behalf may not
be authorized to do so, or may have opposing interests. 72 Due to
these potential abuses, the belief emerged that protective
committees should be considered as fiduciaries to the investors
they represent. 73 Accordingly, the Bankruptcy Code enacted Rule
74
10-211, the direct antecedent of Rule 2019.
C. To Whom Rule 2019 Applies
It would seem, from the legislative history, Rule 2019
specifically applies to entities that act in a fiduciary capacity, but
that are not official committees under other sections of the
Bankruptcy Code. 75 Thus, Rule 2019 applies to attorneys, law
firms, or committees representing more than one creditor or equity
shareholder. 76 As a result, Rule 2019 ensures that lawyers or
those who act in a representative capacity adhere to certain

69. Congress found that protective committees gave rise to abuses because
the committees were plagued by conflicts of financial interest and often
securities holders were induced into believing that their cause was
championed by the protective committee when it actually was not.
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION STUDY AND INVESTIGATION OF THE
WORK, ACTIVITIES, PERSONNEL AND FUNCTIONS OF PROTECTIVE AND
REORGANIZATIONS COMMITTEES, 880 (1937) [hereinafter SEC Report].

Protective committees were also criticized because they offered little
protection for small groups of dissenting creditors. Gwynne, supra note 19, at
110. For example, instances arose where the competing interests of the
committee members resulted in a situation where the committee did not
adequately represent the interest of a particular creditor group. Id.
70. Baron & Budd, 321 B.R. at 166.
71. In re F&C Int'l, Inc., No. 93-11688, 1994 Bankr. LEXIS 274, at *8
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio Feb. 18, 1994).
72. Id.
73. Flaschen & Mayr, supra note 67, at 16.
74. As a result of protective committees' abuses, namely the conflicts of
interest, the SEC report recommended that persons (including committees)
who represent more than twelve creditors or shareholders make disclosures to
the court consisting of the information now found in Rule 2019. SEC REPORT,
supra note 69, at 880.
75. Rule 2019 specifically exempts from its inclusion official committees
organized under Sections 1102 and 1114 of the code, and therefore, applies to
entities behaving as fiduciaries not subject to the control of the court. 9
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 18,

2019.02.

76. In re CF Holding Corp. / Colt's Mfg. Co., 145 B.R. 124, 126 (Bankr. D.
Conn. 1992).
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ethical standards by bringing potential conflicts of interest out
into the open and under the scrutiny of the court.77 It is helpful to
briefly examine a few of the typical conflicts of interest that arise
when forming committees to better understand Rule 2019's
purpose. Although some of these conflicts arise in the context of
Section 1102's official committees, they are also illustrative of
conflicts of interest relating to the formation of committees in
general.
In bankruptcy cases there is tremendous potential for
conflicts of interest to arise when multiple parties are represented
by the same entity. 78 First, a committee possessing competing
fiduciary or contractual duties may not adequately represent the
creditor group. 79 Second, there is potential for conflicts of interest
Finally, there is
between committee members themselves.80
potential for under representation of a particular creditor group.81
Another potential conflict of interest can arise from law firms
representing more than one creditor group. In re Oklahoma P.A.C.
illustrates effectively this very type of conflict of interest in a
Chapter 11 reorganization.8 2 Based on a Rule 2019 disclosure, the
court in In re Oklahoma P.A.C. determined that a conflict of
interest existed because one law firm represented two creditors
77. See id. at 127 (noting that the court would not make a determination of
whether a law firm representing both secured and unsecured creditors gave
rise to conflicts of interest until the law firm complied completely with Rule
2019).
78. At the heart of every bankruptcy case is a limited pool of assets
available for distribution to creditors; hence competing interests will result.
See In re Hills Stores Co., 137 B.R. 4, 6 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) (discussing
how conflicts between creditors occur regularly in bankruptcy, should be
anticipated, and are not foreign).
79. Competing duties may arise where a committee member owes a
fiduciary duty or contractual duty to an entity other than the class of creditors
represented by the committee or where a single committee is appointed to
represent creditors of estates with competing interests. Gwynne, supra note
19, at 120-21.
80. See In re Microboard Processing, Inc., 95 B.R. 283, 285 (Bankr. D. Conn.
1989) (suggesting that conflicts between committee members are inherent and
tolerable); Carl A. Eklund & Lynn W. Roberts, The Problem with Creditors'
Committees in Chapter 11: How to Manage the Inherent Conflicts Without a
Loss of Functions, 5 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 129, 129-30 (1997) (commenting
that there are inherent conflicts between committee members).
81. The following example illustrates the issue of under-representation:
One group of creditors holds a majority of the seats on the committee and its
claim is valued at ten cents on the dollar. Another creditor group holds a
minority of seats on the committee and its claim is valued at eighty cents on
the dollar. Assume further that the debtor proposes a plan that will yield a
recovery of twenty-five cents on the dollar. The creditor group holding the
majority of seats will certainly vote in favor of this plan, much to the
dissatisfaction of the minority group.
82. In re Okla. P.A.C. First Ltd. P'ship., 122 B.R. 387 (Bankr. D. Ariz.
1990).
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holding liens on the same property.8 3 The Rule 2019 disclosure
requirement is an effective method of discovering the distinct and
adverse interests of creditors participating in Chapter 11
84
reorganization.
D. The Language of Rule 2019
The determination of what constitutes a "committee" for
purposes of Rule 2019 is the issue addressed in both Northwest
Airlines and Scotia. To properly analyze this issue, it is necessary
to explore the precise terminology of Rule 2019 in light of its plain
meaning, and according to its usage in other sections of the
Bankruptcy Code.
1. Entity
Rule 2019 requires every entity that represents more than one
creditor to file a disclosure statement comporting with the rule.8 5
"Entity" is broadly defined and is evidence of Congress' intent to
increase the scope of Rule 2019.86 The Bankruptcy Code defines
entity to include "person, estate, trust, governmental unit, and
United States trustee."8 7
Additionally, Merriam Webster's
dictionary defines an entity as "an organization that has an
identity separate from those of its members."8 8 These definitions
both imply that a group of creditors having a distinct identity from
its members is an entity.
2.

Committee

The term "committee" is not defined in Rule 2019 or in
Section 101 of the Bankruptcy Code.8 9 As a result, the term
"committee" should be given its everyday meaning and the
83. One law firm represented two secured claimants who held claims
against the debtor's real property; however, it was never determined which
creditor held a superior lien. Id. at 388-89. The court determined from the
2019 disclosures that if the fair market value of the property was a certain
value, the priority of the liens would become an issue, and the law firm could
not defend the rights of both creditors. Id. at 391-92.
84. See id. at 391-92 (stating that if a law firm cannot "vigorously"
represent the interests of distinct creditors after full disclosure under Rule
2019, the court may direct the law firm to withdraw).
85. FED. R. BANKR. P. 2019(a).
86. See 9 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 18, at App. 2019[2]
(pointing out that the 1987 amendments to the Bankruptcy Rules changed the
word "person" in Rule 2019 to "entity," a broader term).
87. 11 U.S.C. § 101(15) (2000).
88. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, UNABRIDGED 758

(16th ed. 1971).
89. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 2019(a) (using the term "committee" but not
defining it); 11 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (failing to include the term "committee" in
the section that defines many important terms used throughout the
Bankruptcy Code).
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common meaning ascribed to it in legal and general dictionaries. 90
Under a colloquial definition, a "committee" constitutes a group of
people that act on behalf of or for the sake of others. 91 Similarly, a
legal definition of "committee" is an individual or body to whom
others have given the authority to act or delegated a particular
duty. 92 These definitions are consistent with the purpose and
history of Rule 2019, which tend to show that "committee" implies
93
a representative relationship between parties.
The only cases to date that address the definition of a
"committee" and when a committee is subject to Rule 2019 are
Northwest Airlines and Scotia. The Scotia court declined to follow
Northwest Airlines and offered virtually no guidance for resolving
these issues 94 This leaves only the reasoning of the Northwest
court to analyze.
In Northwest Airlines, the court held that the hedge fund ad
hoc committee was a "committee" for purposes of Rule 2019.
Notably, the court found irrelevant the ad hoc committee's
contention that they did not act in a fiduciary capacity. 95 The
court reasoned that even if the committee does not act as a
fiduciary, Rule 2019 still applies because the other shareholders
have a right to the information that will be helpful in deciding
96
whether the committee represents their interests.
Thus, it is apparent in Northwest Airlines that Rule 2019 was
designed to protect both the class represented by the committee

90. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 594-95 (1987) (stating that
"[t]he "plain meaning" of the statute's words ... can control the determination
of legislative purpose.").
91. See WEBSTER'S, supra note 88, at 458 (defining a committee as "a body
of persons delegated to consider, investigate, or take action").
92. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 273 (6th ed. 1990).
2019.02 (mentioning
93. See 9 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 18,
that Rule 2019 applies to entities behaving as fiduciaries not subject to the
control of the court) (emphasis added); see also In re CF Holding Corp., 145
B.R. at 126 (mentioning that Rule 2019 is targeted at entities which act in a
fiduciary capacity to those they represent) (emphasis added).
94. See supra note 57 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of
analysis in In re Scotia).
95. The ad hoc committee argued that given the legislative history of Rule
2019, namely the fact that the rule was designed to apply to entities acting in
a fiduciary capacity, the rule does not apply to them because the committee
does not act for anyone other than the group's members and does not serve as
a fiduciary to any party, not even other members of the committee. In re Nw.,
363 B.R. at 709.
96. See id. (stating that shareholders have a right to full disclosure of the
committee members' purchases and sales, and that this information is
necessary to make an informed decision on whether to form a committee of
their own that will more adequately represent their interests). The Northwest
court also stated that it does not need to find that a committee is a fiduciary to
fall within the scope of Rule 2019. Transcript of Record at 45, In re Northwest
Airlines Corp., 363 B.R. 704 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007) (No. 05-17930).
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and all parties to the bankruptcy case. 97 Importantly, the court
determined that Rule 2019 applied to the ad hoc committee
because the ad hoc committee appeared as a group and sought
relief as a group. 98 Accordingly, the behavior of an entity as a
fiduciary is not the sine qua non for determining whether Rule
2019 applies. The applicability of Rule 2019, rather, turns on
whether the ad hoc committee has acted collectively and whether
either the class represented, or any other party to the case, would
benefit from disclosure.
E. Analysis of Public Policy Arguments
Northwest Airlines has sparked much criticism in the arena of
bankruptcy, particularly by groups who participate in the
secondary debt market and their corresponding trade associations.
These organizations argue that applying Rule 2019 to informal
committees will discourage sophisticated financial institutions
from participating in Chapter 11 reorganizations. 99 In particular,
these groups maintain that participants in the Chapter 11
reorganizations buy and sell claims (debt) based on confidential
and proprietary strategies.10 0 Importantly, these participants
implement an investment strategy that requires continual
adjustment of its position.10 1 Disclosure under Rule 2019 would
give competitors insight into its unique trading strategy.10 2 Part
IV of this Comment will address the public policy arguments
against subjecting hedge funds to Rule 2019. In addition, Part IV
will propose a test to determine under what circumstances an
entity should be subject to Rule 2019's requirements.
IV. BALANCING INTERESTS
The lack of relevant case law regarding whether an ad hoc
committee is subject to Rule 2019's disclosure requirements,
coupled with the little precedential value of the case law that does
exist, provides little guidance in resolving the issue. 103 In the
97. See In re Nw., 363 B.R. at 709 (maintaining that Rule 2019 "gives all
parties a better ability to gauge the credibility of an important group that has
chosen to appear in a bankruptcy case and play a major role").
98. See id. at 708 (stating that when the members of the ad hoc committee
decided to act as a group, the ad hoc committee fell under the scope of Rule
2019).
99. See LSTA Brief, supra note 6, at 1 (pointing out that requiring the
informal committee of secured trade vendors to file a statement pursuant to
Rule 2019 produces a result antithetical to the goals of bankruptcy).
100. Id. at 3.
101. Id.
102. Id. A competitor that understands a participant's trade strategy has an
advantage over that participant because it can identify the participant's
upside and downside potential, and more importantly, its risk tolerance. Id.
103. 9 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 18,
2019.04[4]. See also
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absence of relative case law, the issue is best approached by
relying on bankruptcy principles and balancing competing
interests.
A. Addressing the Public Policy Arguments
Proponents of Rule 2019's applicability to hedge funds argue
that hedge funds are a disruptive force in bankruptcy cases, in
particular Chapter 11 reorganizations. 10 4 In contrast, opponents
of Rule 2019's applicability to ad hoc committees (hedge funds and
similar entities) argue that subjecting an ad hoc committee to Rule
2019's disclosure requirements will have a chilling effect on hedge
This,
fund participation in Chapter 11 reorganizations. 10 5
opponents argue, will hinder reorganization because hedge funds
10 6
bring sophisticated solutions to problems in bankruptcies.
First, if a hedge fund is forced to comply with Rule 2019, it
will be subject to a definite disadvantage. Compliance with Rule
2019 will expose a hedge fund's cost basis because Rule 2019
requires the disclosure of both the amount of the claim and the
time of acquisition. 10 7 Disclosing this data essentially discloses
purchase price information (directly or inferentially through time
of purchase) that is proprietary information in the view of hedge
funds.108
It is difficult to argue that exposing the price paid for an
investment intended to be sold is advantageous to a hedge fund.
Hedge funds, consequently, may be at an inherent disadvantage
when negotiating a Chapter 11 reorganization plan, or attempting

Voorhees, supra note 4, at 5 (noting the lack of an explanation and the court's

conclusory analysis in Scotia).
104. See Flaschen & Mayr, supra note 67, at 48 (noting that Rule 2019,

according to opponents of hedge funds, will curb hedge funds' influence in
bankruptcy). Thus, according to hedge fund adversaries, hedge funds have a

destructive and corrosive influence on the bankruptcy process. Id. See also
supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text (discussing the general distrust
associated with hedge funds in bankruptcy).
105. See Flaschen & Mayr, supra note 67, at 48 (discussing how
necessitating compliance with Rule 2019 will discourage hedge funds and
distressed debt investors from participating in Chapter 11 proceedings).
106. See id. at 49 (mentioning that hedge funds are sophisticated creditors
that should be welcomed in bankruptcy rather than opposed at every
instance).
107. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (stating the specific
requirements under Rule 2019).
108. Reply of the Ad Hoc Equity Committee in Order (A) Pursuant to
Sections 105(a) and 107(b) of the Bankruptcy Code and Rule 9018 of the
Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure Granting Leave to File Its Bankruptcy
Rule 2019(a) Statement Under Seal, and (B) Granting a Temporary Stay
Pending Determination of this Motion, In re Nw. Airline Corp., 363 B.R. 704,
No. 05-17930, 2007 WL 748286 [hereinafter Reply of the Ad Hoc Committee].
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to sell their claims to a third party. 109 What is uncertain, however,
is whether such a disadvantage will ultimately lead to hedge funds
retreating from the bankruptcy arena. Taking the opponents of
Rule 2019's argument at face value, and assuming arguendo that
subjecting ad hoc committees to Rule 2019 will curtail hedge
funds' participation in Chapter 11, it becomes apparent that such
a result is not desirable and runs counter to the goals of
bankruptcy.
The additional costs incurred as a result of disclosing under
Rule 2019 may prove to be a significant barrier to entry in Chapter
11 reorganizations. 110 The secondary debt market, specifically in
the context of Chapter 11 reorganizations, is a true market with
significant market participants: buyers and sellers of debt
instruments, specifically second lien loans."'
The secondary debt market is valuable in Chapter 11
proceedings because it promotes reorganization and workout
agreements by providing an essential source of liquidity to
investors that buy and sell secondary debt. 1 2 This in turn
increases the efficiency of the secondary debt market. 113 Hedge
funds are major participants within this market, and they, like
any other investor in a market, look to maximize their investment.
As a result, hedge funds increase secondary debt liquidity by
offering complex and sophisticated solutions to the workout and
reorganization process, and therefore, facilitate the goal of
collective reorganization. Consequently, if Rule 2019 discourages
hedge fund involvement in bankruptcy, liquidity and efficiency in
the secondary debt market will diminish, hampering the overall
reorganization process.
The argument that hedge funds frustrate the bankruptcy
process because they participate short term or opportunistically

109. See supra note 105 and accompanying text (discussing that compliance
with Rule 2019 will discourage hedge funds and distressed debt investors from
participating in Chapter 11 proceedings).
110. There are two generally accepted definitions of entry barriers. Daniel
E. Lazaroff, Entry Barriers and Contemporary Antitrust Litigation, 7 U.C.
DAVIS Bus. L.J. 1, 2-3 (2006). The first definition of an entry barrier is limited
to costs that a prospective market entrant will have to incur that an existing
market participant did not have to incur when they entered the relevant
market. Id. The second definition deems any cost that deters entry of a
potential entrant to be an entry barrier. Id.
111. See supra note 43 and accompanying text (discussing the secondary
debt market and its role in chapter 11).
112. See Flaschen & Mayr, supra note 67, at 48 (noting that hedge funds are
"true economic creatures" that maximize and bring efficiency to businesses
and markets).
113. See Reply of the Ad Hoc Committee, supra note 108, at 5 (mentioning
that secondary market participants such as hedge funds are "critical to both
the efficiency of the capital markets and to the proper functioning and proper
reorganizations of debtors.").
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engage in strategies designed to own or acquire the debtor
company,114 simply ignores a fundamental principle of bankruptcy:
placing the property of a business in the hands of parties who will
use it the most efficiently. Hedge funds that acquire a business as
a result of bankruptcy reorganization advances this objective.
B. A Presumptionof Non-Applicability
The public policy goal of bankruptcy, namely the placement of
property in the hands of parties who will use it most effectively, is
promoted by granting hedge funds favored status in bankruptcy
cases. Rule 2019 potentially discourages participation by hedge
funds in the bankruptcy process and should only be employed in
instances that require the balancing of competing interests. This
favored status would contain a rebuttable presumption that an ad
hoc committee is not subject to Rule 2019 unless a court finds the
committee acts de facto as a fiduciary, or other circumstances are
present which may give rise to potential conflicts of interest.
C. When to Apply Rule 2019 to an Ad Hoc Committee
Granting hedge funds' ad hoc committees a favored status
under the Bankruptcy Code and creating a presumption against
subjecting them to Rule 2019 is the first necessary step to advance
the public policy goals of bankruptcy reorganization. Under what
circumstances, however, should an ad hoc committee be subject to
Rule 2019? To answer this question, it is necessary to revisit the
purpose and significance of Rule 2019.
First, the legislative history of Rule 2019 strongly indicates
the Rule was created as an attempt to combat conflicting interests
arising between bankruptcy committee members and those they
represent. 115 The legislative history also indicates that Rule 2019,
when originally drafted, was intended to apply to entities that act
in a representative or fiduciary capacity. 1 6 Accordingly, ad hoc
committees and hedge funds argue that because their committee
does not act in a fiduciary capacity, they should not be subject to
Rule 2019.117
The ad hoc committee's argument however, is a non sequiter.
Simply because Rule 2019 was intended to apply to entities acting
as fiduciaries, it does not necessarily follow that Rule 2019 should
not apply to entities not acting as fiduciaries. The fact that a
114. See, e.g., In re Radnor, 353 B.R. at 823 (involving a Chapter 11 case
that resulted in a hedge fund acquiring the debtor's business).
115. For a thorough discussion on the legislative purpose of Rule 2019, see
supra Part III(B): "The History and Purpose of Rule 2019."
116. See supra Part III(C) (discussing the various conflicts of interest that
arise when entities act in a fiduciary capacity).
117. See id. (discussing the ad hoc committee's contention that Rule 2019
only applies to committees that are fiduciaries).
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committee does not act in a fiduciary capacity should not exempt it
from Rule 2019. If a committee acts in a fiduciary capacity, it
should be subject to Rule 2019 because this is consistent with the
legislative purpose behind Rule 2019.118 If, however, a committee
does not act as a fiduciary, there should be a presumption that the
committee is not subject to Rule 2019 unless other circumstances
are present, namely potential conflicts of interests. This policy is
consistent with the history and purpose behind Rule 2019.119
Applying Rule 2019 to entities behaving as fiduciaries
comports with the legislative history behind Rule 2019 and also
addresses conflicts of interest between committee members and
their constituents, committee members themselves, and all parties
to a bankruptcy case.1 20 This is consistent with the Northwest
Airlines decision to the extent that. they held that there does not
need to be a fiduciary relationship present in order to hold a
committee subject to Rule 2019.121
V. THE COMPLETE TEST
Hedge funds and their ad hoc committees enhance the
bankruptcy reorganization process. In recognition of this benefit,
Rule 2019 should not be used as a sword against hedge fund
participation in the bankruptcy process.
Discouraging hedge
funds from participating in bankruptcy cases, particularly Chapter
11 reorganizations, is detrimental to the reorganization process as
a whole. To encourage hedge fund participation in the
reorganization process, there should be a rebuttable presumption
that Rule 2019 does not apply to hedge funds' ad hoc committees.
The burden should be placed on the opposing party to demonstrate
that a hedge fund ad hoc committee either acts as a fiduciary or a
conflict of interest exists, triggering Rule 2019. These sensible
changes to the application of Rule 2019 promotes the underlying
public policy behind bankruptcy reorganization and encourages
the vital participation of hedge funds in the reorganization
process.

118. The legislative history clearly indicates that Rule 2019 was intended to
apply to entities that act in a fiduciary capacity. See supra note 75 and
accompanying text (mentioning Collier's view that Rule 2019 applies to
committees that act as fiduciaries).
119. See supra Part III, Section C (discussing the various conflicts of interest
that arise when entities act in fiduciary capacity).
120. This is the view of the Northwest Airlines court. See In re Nw. Airlines,
363 B.R. at 709 (holding that it is not necessary to find that a committee is a
fiduciary to fall within the scope of Rule 2019); see also supra note 97 and
accompanying text (discussing that Rule 2019 is designed for all parties to a
bankruptcy case).
121. Id.

